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Abstract: Dependence on cloud services has been steadily increasing in recent 
years, as cloud services are an attractive option to offer flexibility and cost effec-
tiveness through economies of scale. Cloud services are also exposed to security 
incidents, such as data breaches and other malicious activities. To mitigate risks to 
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of assets, but also minimise loss to 
cloud service providers and users, the attack trust and risk elements need to be 
identified, classified, and prioritised. The aim of the proposed conceptual frame-
work is to combine trust and risk assessment sources with data of risk assessment 
related to each attack pattern. This novel approach is a new qualitative solution to 
examine and determine symptoms, indicators, and vulnerabilities to detect the im-
pact and likelihood of distributed attacks directed at cloud computing environ-
ments. The proposed framework might help to reduce false positive alarms and 
improve performance in Intrusion Detection Systems. 
Keywords: Cloud computing, Trust Assessment, Risk Assessment, Attack Pat-
tern, IDS, Ontology 
1.1 Introduction 
Cloud computing is a new emerging model in Information Technology (IT) that 
can enable convenient, ubiquitous, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources. Those resources can also be released with min-
imal management effort and interactions can be rapidly provisioned (Zhang et al. 
2010). Cloud computing represents an opportunity for both service providers and 
consumers, through the improvement of IT agility, efficiency, and reliability to re-
duce the cost of IT technologies. Specifically, on-demand self-service, resource 
pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service, cloud computing systems automat-
ically control and optimize resource usage in order to offer an alternative method 
to rent computing and storage infrastructure services (Zissis and Lekkas 2012). 
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Cloud services are provided dynamically to its users via internet, which can 
lead to several attacks threatening their confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of the data stored in the cloud (Jadeja and Modi 2012). Detecting attacks can be 
challenging for security administrators. Therefore, the use of Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) can aid both cloud providers and security administrators to monitor 
and analyse network traffic (Aikat et al. 2017). The reason for using such systems 
is to prevent attacks by employing detection algorithms. Such algorithms monitor 
symptoms, analyse attack patterns, and then produce a multitude of alarms known 
as false alarms (Duque and bin Omar 2015). 
The proposed framework aims to analyse risks related to each attack pattern. 
Specifically, it calculates risks related to each symptom, indicator and vulnerabil-
ity in order to define the attack risk score, and then generate an alert. 
In the subsequent sections a review of related detection approaches in cloud 
computing is provided. The underpinning systems required for the recommended 
solution are also presented. Then, the author describes the proposed framework. In 
the concluding section, a discussion about recommendations for further research is 
presented. 
1.2 Related Detection Approaches 
When it comes to detection approaches, security researchers require a mecha-
nism that can integrate and analyse a wide variety of data sources. Particularly, 
they need a mechanism that can process information that is generated by hetero-
genous sources implemented in any cloud computing environment. These mecha-
nisms should aim to detect attack patterns and reduce false positive alarms. 
Hansman et al (2005) employed five classifiers to describe different types of at-
tack. Specifically, classification by attack vendor, classification by attack target, 
classification by operational impact, classification by informational impact, and 
classification by defense. All this information can provide the network administra-
tor with data on how to mitigate or deter an attack. Amer and Hamilton (2010) de-
veloped an ontology based attack model to assess the security of an information 
system from an attacker’s point of view. The aim of the assessment process is to 
evaluate the effects of an attack. The process consists of four stages. The first 
stage consists of identifying the system’s vulnerabilities using automated vulnera-
bility tools. These tools evaluate vulnerabilities of computer systems, applications 
or networks and generate sets of scan results. The second stage, involves deter-
mining the attacks that might occur due to the previously identified vulnerabilities. 
In the third stage, the possible effects of those vulnerabilities are analysed. The 
fourth and final stage the attack effects are calculated.  
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Patel et al. (2013) proposed a four dimensions approach that provides classifi-
cation covering network and computer attacks. Specifically, it provides assistance 
in improving network and computer security, as well as language consistency 
through attack description. The first dimension focuses on classifying the attack. 
The second classifies the target of the attack. The third provides vulnerability clas-
sification or uses criteria from Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) approach. The 
fourth dimension, addresses the effects of the attack. 
Ficco et al. (2013) recommended a hybrid and event correlation approach for 
detecting attack patterns. The process involves detecting symptoms by collecting 
diverse information at several cloud levels in order to perform a complex event 
analysis presented in an ontology. 
All of the previously mentioned methodologies demonstrate beneficial ontolo-
gy that may offer informative guidelines regarding cyber intrusions and attack 
analysis. However, there is lack of detail required to analyse all symptoms and at-
tacks that could in return minimise the number of false positive alarms. For in-
stance, the same attack in two different cloud services may have a different degree 
of impact, but in most existing systems it would be classed as a malicious attack 
by both services. 
The proposed framework addresses this issue, of a system generating multiple 
false positive alarms, through the implication of risk and trust assessment analysis 
in the detection process. In this approach, all actors, such as cloud providers and 
cloud customers participate in the data analysis to achieve a high level of infor-
mation and data processing. Before describing the proposed framework, though, 
the underpinning systems are presented. 
1.3 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
An IDS is very important in terms of preventing an attack against an Infor-
mation Technology (IT) organisation. An IDS conducts a security system diagno-
sis to discover all suspicious activities based on detection algorithms. Specifically, 
those systems can help to deter and prevent actions related to security breaches, 
system flaws, as well as potential threats that may lead to system violations (Bace 
and Mell 2001).  
On the other hand, an IDS system may detect many false actions, but it may al-
so lead to a number of false positive alarms and authorized users identified as in-
truders. In a cloud computing environment where all resources are shared amongst 
cloud customers, this point becomes even more critical. In order to minimise the 
number of false positive alarms and improve the efficiency of attack detection in 
all cloud computing environments, the proposed framework includes both cloud 
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service providers and cloud customers as part of the correlation process in all 
cloud layers, such as Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), 
and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). 
1.4 Trust Assessment System 
Trust assessment in cloud computing facilitates a variety of information 
sources at different levels of abstraction and several deployment models (SaaS, 
PaaS, IaaS). Therefore, trust evaluation and changing nature of trust relationships 
among different entities in the cloud paradigm become important points to be ad-
dressed (Subashini and Kavitha 2011). Specifically, trust assessment models in-
clude a collection of rules, elements, and process’ to develop trust amongst the 
different entities in any computing paradigm. Cloud computing environment com-
ponents such as databases, virtual machines, cloud service providers, cloud service 
customers, and cloud services are examples of different entities. Trust models are 
classified in two categories, decision models and evaluation models. These models 
are applied to the cloud computing paradigm and are further developed through 
their connection with trust assessment techniques (Moyano et al. 2012). 
The cloud users’ service-related needs are constantly changing in the diverse 
environment of cloud computing. Consequently, the role of various factors, such 
as feedback, ratings, and Quality of Service (QoS), in trust assessment is very im-
portant. There are four main trust assessment information sources. Specifically, di-
rect and indirect interaction, Cloud Service Provider declarations, and Third Party 
assessment (Mouratidis et al. 2013).  
Trust dimensions is the other significant area that measures the security 
strength and computes a trust value. A trust value comprises of various parameters 
that are necessary dimensions to measure cloud services’ security (Huang and 
Nicol 2013). 
1.5 Risk Assessment System 
Risk assessment can be identified as the potential that a given attack will ex-
ploit vulnerabilities of an asset or a group of assets to cause loss or damage to the 
assets. According to the ISO 27005 Risk Management, risk is measured by evalu-
ating the probability of successful attacks and the subsequent impact of those at-
tacks, should they occur (Duque and bin Omar 2015). 
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Risk = Impact * Likelihood (Humphreys 2008) 
 
Specifically, the term Impact refers to the degree of which a risk event might 
affect an enterprise, expressed in terms of: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authen-
tication. The term Likelihood refers to the possibility that a given event may occur 
(Duque and bin Omar 2015). The implementation of the aforementioned equation 
in the proposed framework aims to stimulate cloud customers to evaluate security 
risks and simplify the analysis of all identified events. 
1.6 Proposed Framework for Attack Pattern Detection through 
Trust and Risk Assessment 
The proposed framework is a predictive model that detects attack patterns 
based on trust assessment and risk assessment analysis. Figure 1 presents a corre-
lation process that consists of a sequence of activities that are designed to analyse 
all network traffic through cloud layers (Valeur et al. 2004). The proposed frame-
work applies a correlation process that intends to unify different steps of correla-
tion by adding risk and trust assessment analysis in the diagnosis step, before the 
taxonomy step takes place.  
 
 
Figure 1: Correlation Process (Valeur et al. 2004) 
An attack pattern is an abstraction mechanism that describes how an observed 
attack type is executed. Following the lifecycle of cyber-attack, when an attack 
occurs it uses several paths, from reconnaissance to exploitation, and aims to gain 
unauthorized access to data (Shin et al. 2013). Through studying the impact effects 
of an attack and simplifying the analysis of monitored events, then it could be pos-
sible to minimise false positive alarms.  
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Figure 2 shows the proposed framework’s three essential security functions: (1) 
Monitoring & Data Collection, (2) Analysing & Detecting, and (3) Alarm & Re-
spond. 
(1) Monitoring & Data Collection. As a first step, the requirements of the 
organisation are defined based on monitoring the event management logs 
of all cloud layers (IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS). The next step is to collect data 
through Risk Software Agent (RSAg) programs. An RSAg is a goal-
oriented computer program that reacts to its environment and operates 
without continuous direct supervision to perform its function. The RSAg 
programs store data from IaaS, PaaS, and SaaS. The data storage is struc-
tured in two separate knowledge databases that do not communicate. These 
are the Trust Assessment Database and the Risk Assessment Database. The 
reason for recommending two isolated databases is to reassure cloud pro-
viders for data pseudonymisation. The cloud providers processing of per-
sonal data is conducted in a way that the data can no longer be attributed to 
a specific data subject without the use of additional information (Bolognini 
and Bistolfi 2017). The pseudonymised information from those two data-
bases is then combined in the Self-Learning Knowledge Base, which feeds 
with data the next function. 
(2) Analysing & Detecting. The analysis of attack patterns is conducted by 
calculating the score of all indicators. Specifically, the proposed solution 
includes a definition for Risk (Ri) as a product of the Probability (Po) of a 
security compromise and its potential Impact (Im) (see 1). 
Ri = Po * Im (1) 
The recommended correlation is used to aggregate the attack scenarios and 
symptoms generated by all parts in the cloud computing environment. The 
Impact (Im) is a value consisting of the following indicators: Trust As-
sessment Indicator (TaI), Vulnerability (Vu) and Symptoms (Sy). Each of 
these indicators has a different impact. The Probability (Po) value is in-
creased in relation to each indicator of an attack pattern (see 2). 
Im = TaI + Vu + Sy (2) 
The Impact (Im) and Probability (Po) of each indicator is defined by the 
cloud customer and cloud provider using data collected from all cloud lay-
ers. The aim is to use attackers’ behavior to determine the Impact (Im) and 
expose a potential attacker before an attack can take place. The value of 
Risk (Ri) related to each attack determines whether the attack is successful 
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or false positive alarm depending on the sensitivity of the targeted data as 
defined by the owner (cloud provider and cloud customer) (see 3). All this 
information is processed and stored in the Processing Knowledge Base. 
Ri = Po * (TaI + Vu + Sy) (3) 
(3) Alarm & Respond. The risk of the attack is calculated and a response is 
sent whether it represents a suspicious threat or a false positive alarm. This 
is conducted with mechanisms that classify information about all attacks 
and determine the impact of each attack pattern and the risk of the attack. 
Specifically, the use of machine-learning procedures, such as supervised 
classification and clustering, and analytic algorithms has been proven use-
ful to similar proactive detection and defense models (Fu et al. 2010; Osa-
ko et al. 2016). The respond function is conducted in the Decision Making 
server that determines the impact of every attack and serves as an Advice 
as a Service for the organisations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Proposed Framework for Attack Pattern Detection 
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1.7 Conclusion 
In the current study a new framework for attack pattern detection in the cloud 
computing paradigm is proposed. A framework to recognise and analyse mali-
cious actions based on risk and trust assessment factors and information sources 
related to attack patterns. Specifically, the recommended framework classifies at-
tacks by evaluating the probability of a security breach and its potential impact in-
dicators, such as trust assessment indicator, vulnerability, and symptoms. The out-
come of this evaluation gives the likelihood of an attack pattern risk. Both cloud 
providers and cloud customers are involved in the data collection and correlation 
process. This classification might aid to protect data in the cloud and provide a 
method that could efficiently analyse suspicious attack actions and reduce false 
positive alarms. 
In the cloud computing environment, risk and trust assessment need to be as-
sessed continuously using multiple factors. These factors keep changing in the dy-
namic and constantly evolving cloud computing paradigm. Moreover, multi-cloud 
environments demand a more risk and trust assessment oriented analysis. There-
fore, risk and trust assessment needs of cloud providers and cloud customers’ have 
to be addressed in more detail. Therefore, a taxonomy and analysis of risk and 
trust assessment techniques in the cloud computing paradigm is required. Finally, 
future work should test the implementation of the suggested framework in an ac-
tual cloud computing environment. 
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